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1
I was so sure, and that, I think, was what blinded me.

-Agatha
I.

Christie

INTRODUCTION

Philosophy and justice have always had a rocky relationship. Socra-

tes, remember, was put to death for teaching young people to question
received wisdom on matters of public importance. 2 Yet his pupil Plato
dared to maintain that philosophers possessed ways of thinking that
could help answer our most puzzling questions about the nature of both
truth and justice. This is our paradox: Sometimes our culture holds philosophy to be essential to define and support just social institutions, and
sometimes philosophy appears either to undermine those institutions or
to be irrelevant to them.
Philosophers and legal theorists recently have been embroiled in a
new debate about the relationships between philosophy and justice. This
debate encompasses two issues. The first is the contest between objectivism and pragmatism. Objectivists believe that there are right answers to
our most fundamental questions about truth and justice, and that we can
*
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1. AGATHA CHRISTIE, MISS MARPLE: THE COMPLETE SHORT STORIES 155 (1985).
2. For what I.F. Stone calls the "Athenian side of the story," see I.F. STONE, THE TRIAL OF
SOCRATES (1988).
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discover the answers to these questions by thinking in the right way. We
discover these answers either by "drawing up truths from within or receiving atomistic sensations from without."' 3 Pragmatists, on the other
hand, emphasize that truth is not something we discover that is either
external to us or intuitively self-evident. Rather, truth is a human creation-what is true depends partly on our purposes and partly on how we,
individually and as a society, choose to describe the world. What is true
is not simply given, there for us to discover; it is, at least partly, made by
4
people, and therefore, changeable.
The second issue in this debate is whether paying attention to philosophic methodology is necessary to understand and establish social justice, or irrelevant to it. On one side are those who argue for the "end of
ideology," suggesting that we should get on with the business of discussing what we mean by "social justice" and how to achieve it, rather than
fussing about irrelevant questions of metaphysics. On the other side are
those who argue that the way we formulate any inquiry about social justice will have crucial effects on the answers we generate, and that methodological questions are therefore of paramount importance.
These two issues are often linked in the following way: On one side
are those who claim that we are all pragmatists now, and that we should
therefore stop quibbling about methodology and get on with the business
of promoting social justice by imagining better ways to implement our
democratic ideals. On the other side are those who claim that whether or
not we are all pragmatists, methodology continues to matter greatly. It
matters partly because those of us who had hoped to escape discredited
objectivist ideas may be recreating them unconsciously in a new form.
But more importantly, methodology matters because if we are not careful
about the way we structure inquiry, then-whatever our intentions-we
may recreate the illegitimate power structures we were trying to identify
and undermine.
This debate engages what Elizabeth V. Spelman has called the "antiredeposition" problem. Spelman notes that detergents that work well
prevent "the dirt taken out of concentrated spots from being redeposited
more generally over the whole load." 5 We pragmatist critics of objectivism should be on guard against our tendency unconsciously to recreate
3. ISRAEL SCHEFFLER, FOUR PRAGMATISTS:
JAMES, MEAD, AND DEWEY 20 (1974).

A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO PEIRCE,

4. JOHN DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY 96, 114-16 (1948) (emphasizing the
"place of active and planning thought within the very processes of experience" and hence the connection between human purposes and knowledge).
5. ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST
THOUGHT 5 (1988).
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objectivist assumptions in new forms by inventing ever new ways of implying that answers to our questions can be "found" in some external
source. By using the language of "finding answers," and similar "finding" metaphors, we "redeposit" responsibility for social life in some
source other than human actors. We should guard against this because
one goal of pragmatism is to recognize and accept responsibility for the
judgments we make about what is important in human experience and
about what it means. 6 Similarly, we theorists of social justice should be
on guard against our own tendency to use modes of analysis that support
the illegitimate forms of privilege we were hoping to abolish. Doing this
is hard work: Those of us who are privileged in various ways may reinforce our own privileges either by ignoring them or by focusing on them.
If we ignore them, we may adopt unconscious assumptions that place
ourselves and our concerns at the center of attention; if we focus on
them, we make ourselves and "our sins the most interesting and most
'7
pressing thing to talk about: so we are still center stage."
The debate between objectivists and pragmatists has benefitted from
the highly valuable contributions of Richard Rorty. He has led the recent revival of interest in pragmatism. His dissection and radical critique
of traditional conceptions of philosophy has been enormously creative
and helpful. Rorty has done us a great service by helping to clarify and
free us from adherence to outworn vocabularies, questions, and lines of
inquiry. He also has suggested what it might be like to live in a world
where people did not require metaphysical foundations for their deepest
beliefs. At the same time, in my view, Rorty has helped to fashion an
unintentionally (according to him) conservative conception of the role of
philosophic inquiry in constructing social justice. Although Rorty has
helped to revive pragmatism, he also has marginalized the enterprise of
philosophy, thereby depriving pragmatism of any critical bite. Whatever
his intentions, the effect of his rhetoric is to reinforce existing structures
of domination.
The conservative flavor of Rorty's version of pragmatism is important because, in many ways, it is similar to versions of practical reasoning
that have become popular among some legal theorists.8 These theorists
6. J. DEWEY, supra note 4, at 163 (focusing on concrete situations of moral conflict locates
responsibility in the decisionmaker by requiring the exercise of intelligent judgment); see also DAVID
MAMET, WRING IN RESTAURANTS 130-34 (1986) (understanding truth as context-dependent
places responsibility in the artist to create meaning).
7. E.V. SPELMAN, supra note 5, at 5.
8. For examples of scholarship in this mode, see William Eskridge, Jr. and Philip Frickey,
Statutory Interpretationas PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Daniel Farber, Bril.
liance Revisited, 72 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1987); Daniel Farber & Philip Frickey, PracticalReason
and the FirstAmendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615 (1987); Anthony Kronman, Practical Wisdom
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join pragmatists in asserting that many of our old questions are outworn,
and that we should stop fumbling around with them and address ourselves to what really matters. But the way these theorists characterize
the questions that confront us will make it harder to adopt a critical
stance toward current social practices. This is so despite the fact that
many of these theorists are interested in social change. 9
The poverty of Rorty's version of pragmatic thought can best be
understood by comparing his vision of the relation between philosophy
and justice with an alternative vision. For this purpose, I take the work
of Elizabeth V. Spelman to be exemplary. In contrast to Rorty, Spelman
provides a model of inquiry that takes the challenge of pragmatism seriously. She uses a variety of philosophical techniques to explore and expose the ways in which our categories of thought and modes of analysis
channel our attention in particular directions, thereby making certain issues and questions salient while suppressing others. In so doing, our paradigms of thought render the experiences of some people central and
those of others peripheral. By taking our attention away from the experiences, concerns, and lived reality of marginalized or disempowered people, our habits of thinking reinforce oppression.
The way we conceptualize both social relationships and moral inquiry affects legal analysis. To the extent those conceptions conceal the
workings of power, the legal system helps perpetuate social injustice.
Through her careful exploration of those conceptions, Spelman challenges our habits of thinking that reinforce the illegitimate power relations we had hoped to challenge. She shows how philosophical analysis
can help expose oppression-and that is why lawyers should care about
philosophy.
II.

SOLID-ARrrY

I do not think that there are any plain moral facts out there in the
world, nor any truths independent of language, nor any neutral ground
on which to stand and argue that either torture or kindness are preferable to the other.10
and Professional Character,in PHILOSOPHY AND LAW (J. Coleman & E. Paul eds. 1987); Anthony
Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567 (1985); Richard Posner,
The Jurisprudenceof Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REv. 827 (1988); Vincent Wellman, PracticalReasoning andJudicialJustification: Toward an Adequate Theory, 57 U. COLO. L. REv. 45 (1985). For
critiques of practical reasoning, see Jay Feinman, PracticalLegal Studies and CriticalLegal Studies,
87 MICH. L. REv. 724 (1988); Allan Hutchinson, The Three 'R's': Reading/Rorty/Radically, 103
HARV. L. REv. 555 (1989).
9. See, eg., John Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 33 (1986) (arguing
that scholars should stop focusing on questions of methodology and, instead, address questions of
social change and social justice directly).
10. RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 173 (1989).
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The view I am offering says that there is such a thing as moral progress, and that this progress is indeed in the direction of greater human
solidarity .... [That solidarity is] the ability to see more and more
traditional differences (of tribe, religion, race, customs, and the like) as
unimportant when compared with similarities with respect to pain and
humiliation-the ability to think of people wildly different from ourselves as included in the range of "us.""
-Richard
A.

Rorty

Contingency and Commitment

In Richard Rorty's most recent book, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, he clarifies his position on the relation between philosophy and
justice. Rorty firmly champions the cause of the pragmatists against the
objectivists. He argues that the greatest contribution of pragmatism is
the recognition of contingency. Rorty explains that the problem with the
objectivist philosophic tradition from Plato to Kant is that philosophers
defined the goal of inquiry as identifying secure foundations for knowledge that would be independent of place and time. The preeminent
method of identifying objective bases for belief was a form of essentialism, that is, discovering the inherent nature of human beings, truth, and
justice by reflecting on their essence. The goal of philosophy was to ensure that the mind was an accurate mirror of reality, so that the essential
nature of things could be correctly described.12
In contrast, Rorty argues against this representational theory of
truth. Truth is not outside human beings, waiting to be discovered; nor
is it found in self-evident intuitions. Either of these formulations assumes an inherent structure to the world that only needs to be foundwhether outside us or within us-and then elaborated. Rather, according to Rorty, truth is active, social, contingent, and changing. We are
3
not passive observers, but active participants, in the creation of truth.'
Since many different, incompatible theories can describe or explain the
world, the truth is not fixed and final, but entails a choice among competing possible descriptions. Truth is constructed by people for their own
purposes; it is therefore necessarily contingent-relative to historical and
social context. Although the world is external to human beings, descriptions of the world are not. "To say that truth is not out there is simply to
say that where there are no sentences there is no truth, that sentences are
11. Id. at 192.
12. See RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979) (arguing against
correspondence or representational theories of truth).
13. R. RORTY, supra note 10, at 3.
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elements of human languages, and that human languages are human
4
creations."'
This pragmatic attitude toward truth asks us to accept the fact that
there can be no final answers to our most important questions. Truth
and justice are both partly a matter of experimentation, of finding out
what works and trying out different forms of life. The process of discerning the truth is not passive: We do not sit back and observe the world
from a distance. Truth and justice are partly matters of choice-they
require us to take responsibility for the world we create. This means that
there can be no neutral, non-contingent bases for our most fundamental
facts or values. We are implicated in what we value, as we are implicated
in what we believe.
What does this view of philosophy mean for the possibility of establishing social justice? Rorty argues that philosophy has a negative role to
play but not an affirmative one. The negative or edifying role of pragmatism is to free us from the sense that we can find answers to questions of
social justice by deducing the essential nature of humanity and the conditions of its fulfillment from self-evident premises. Rather, the pragmatist
advises us to elaborate and implement the contingent values of democratic institutions embedded in our culture. According to Rorty, these
are not philosophical questions, but rather political ones.' 5 This point is
purely negative: It eliminates one way to think about the meaning of
justice, telling us what philosophy cannot do for us in the public world of
law and justice. The pragmatist, in Rorty's view, hopes to eliminate both
the utility of, and the need for, uncontestable, context-independent foundations for justice.
But what role can philosophy play in helping us affirmatively to
think about justice and to establish it in the world-to elaborate the
democratic values embedded in our culture? Rorty explains that philosophy may help us to redescribe our values once we have been prompted to
change them for other reasons. "[P]hilosophy is one of the techniques
for reweaving our vocabulary of moral deliberation in order to accommodate new beliefs."' 6 But philosophy appears to have no positive role to
help us in attaining new beliefs, or even in clarifying the beliefs we already have.
Rorty further argues that the recognition of contingency has significant affirmative consequences only for private reflection and fulfillment,
that is, for the pursuit of self-creation and autonomy. Contingency, ae14. Id. at 5.

15. Id. at 68.
16. Id. at 196.
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cording to his view, has no implications for public values designed to
create a better social world, other than the negative role of freeing us
from the sense that we both need and can find timeless foundations for
our values, or proof that they are the right values.' 7 But this is not quite
right: Rorty sometimes implies that focusing on contingency would have
disturbing implications, rather than no implications, for the task of establishing social justice and democratic institutions.
The central point of Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity is to establish a public/private distinction.' 8 In the private sphere of individual
pursuit of self-fulfillment, Rorty claims our goal should be autonomy,
self-creation, playful deconstruction. 9 The recognition of contingency is
our greatest tool to attain these ends; this is so because it is a crucial
element in freeing us from social structures that prevent us from creating
our own world. And, according to Rorty, autonomy requires the ability
to create something entirely new; he believes that this is what gives an
individual life its meaning. His model for the attainment of autonomy is
the ironic stance; in the private sphere, Rorty suggests we seek distance
from inherited vocabularies-that we be skeptical and questioning of
established ways of being, modes of life, types of expression-all so that
we can become free and self-creating. Freedom is defined as escaping
both the burdens of the past and present social controls. We can do this
in our individual lives, Rorty claims, by viewing those controls with detachment, with a sense of irony. This sense of irony helps us to recognize
the contingency of the social and imaginative world in which we find
ourselves, and thus to free ourselves from it. This, in turn, allows us to
imbue our lives with meaning by making something of ourselves, rather
20
than playing out a script written in advance by others.
In the public sphere of law and justice, on the other hand, Rorty
suggests that our two goals should be to prevent cruelty and to extend
our capacity to identify with people different from ourselves. These goals
are summarized in the notion of solidarity. 2' Our tools to promote solidarity with our fellow human beings are social experimentation and
novels. Novels--detailed poetic descriptions of other people's liveshelp us to empathize with other people who seem strange to us and with
whom we cannot immediately identify. 22 Social experimentation tells us
what works and what does not work in the way of promoting well-being
17. Id. at 83 (explaining that the recognition of contingency is irrelevant to politics except to
free us from a sense of inevitability).
18. Id. at xiv-xvi, 141-43.
19. Id. at 39-40.

20. Id. at 73-95.
21. Id. at 189-98.
22. Id. at 94.
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and freedom. In the public sphere, obsession with contingency and an
ironic stance are unhelpful and possibly dangerous; they wrongly counsel
distance, indifference, and playfulness when what we need in this area of
life are empathy with others, attention to suffering, and a passion to
make things work-in other words, commitment. And commitment,
23
Rorty concludes, is incompatible with irony.
Yet commitment is not incompatible, Rorty claims, with a recognition of contingency. The recognition of contingency is recognition that
the values of one's culture are simply the values of one's culture, rather
than the earthly embodiments of timeless truths. Rorty hopes both to
separate and link the public and private aspects of life by acknowledging
both contingency and commitment. He argues that "the citizens of my
liberal utopia would be people who had a sense of the contingency of
their language of moral deliberation, and thus of their consciences, and
thus of their community." 24 At the same time, they would have a sense
of solidarity with their fellows; they would be the kind of "people who
combined commitment with a sense of the contingency of their own
'25
commitment.
Although Rorty comes down firmly on the side of the pragmatists,
he stands with those who claim that philosophic reflection is irrelevant to
politics. I want to agree with Rorty on the pragmatic stance, but to disagree about his position on the relation between philosophy and justice
and, hence, with his specific vision of pragmatism. Rorty's argument for
pragmatism is powerful, but he steps back from the implications of his
own insights. By splitting pragmatism into a public and a private component, he has disarmed it, creating a form of public discourse that not
only betrays the insights of pragmatism, but also stands in the way of
establishing social justice. In separating philosophy from the public
sphere, Rorty separates himself from his hero, John Dewey. Dewey, unlike Rorty, saw the problems of philosophy as inseparable from the
problems of collective life. 2 6 In contrast, Rorty offers us little but platitudes about democratic institutions. By separating philosophy from justice, Rorty's vision reinforces existing power relations that illegitimately
27
oppress and exclude large segments of the population.
23. Id. at 190.
24. Id. at 61.
25. Id.
26.' J. DEWEY, supra note 4, at 26, 124 (arguing that philosophers should devote themselves to
clearing up the causes of social evils and developing clear ideas of better social possibilities and how
to achieve them).
27. See CORNEL WEST, THE AMERICAN EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY: A GENEALOGY OF PRAGMATISM 71-111 (1989) (arguing that Dewey wanted philosophers to engage with social problems).
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Defects in Rorty's Vision of Pragmatism

1. A Faulty View of Politics. The first problem with Rorty's argument is that his view of politics is oversimplified. He imagines that there
is either an obvious meaning to "democratic institutions" such as a free
press, free universities, and an independent judiciary, 2 8 or that there is a
general consensus about what these institutions are and how to implement them. His description of the meaning of democracy and social justice is remarkably terse, and he seems to believe it needs no elaboration.
Yet, as Richard Bernstein has argued, once we get down to the political
task of implementing justice, of specifying what those institutions are and
how they should work, all kinds of disagreements arise, both about how
to conceptualize justice and how to implement it.29 Moreover, these disagreements are not merely technical questions about the best way to implement shared ends; rather, they implicate the ends themselves. Indeed,
the very distinction between means and ends is contentious; one person's
means is another person's end.
Rorty emphasizes the recognition of contingency solely for the purpose of arguing that we do not need uncontestable, culture-independent,
grounds for accepting whichever values we accept. This is what he
means when he says that politics is political, not metaphysical. Yet
Rorty's recognition of contingency is incomplete: He believes that a society's values are relative to place and time, but he fails to note that a
society, particularly a pluralistic one like ours, may exhibit within itself
conflicting norms. He is a pragmatist as to the foundations, but not the
content, of public values. When he speaks about social experimentation, 30 he seems to mean experimentation with means rather than ends,
as if we agreed on the meaning of freedom and the only question was the
best way to implement it. He recognizes contingency in the sense that
values are relative to different cultures; but he does not seem to recognize
that it is also contingent what a particular culture's values are, or that
there may be significant disagreements about those values and how to
implement them.
28. Id. at 84.
29. Richard Bernstein, One Step Forward,Two Steps Backward: RichardRorty on LiberalDemocracy and Philosophy, 15 POL. THEORY 538, 556-60 (1987); see also ROBERTO MANGAEIRA
UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY: ITS SITUATION AND ITS TASK-A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO POLITICS, A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL THEORY (1987) [hereinafter R. UNOER, SOCIAL THE-

ORY] (arguing against the idea that there are a fixed number of social systems with inherent
structures); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986)
[hereinafter R. UNGER, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES] (same).

30. Richard Rorty, Thugs and Theorists: A Reply to Bernstein, 15 POL. THEORY 564, 565
(1987).
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Rorty sought to "de-divinize" philosophy, but he has concluded by
divinizing politics.31 He has objectified politics and justice by failing to
recognize that there are vast disagreements in our society about the
meaning of democracy and about the just social context in which individuals are to live. He also fails to recognize that there are large disagreements about which decisions are legitimately matters of individual choice
within a given social context. Rorty has redeposited objective, contextindependent, neutral grounds for social practices in a reified notion of
society. He assumes greater coherence and uniformity to "our" culture
than he should. These oversimplifications have important consequences:
They take our attention away from consideration both of who is benefited
and harmed by different political and social structures and who has had
the power to shape those structures.
If we follow Rorty's example and presume consensus on the meaning of "democracy" and "free institutions," where will we find the meaning of these abstract concepts? Where else but in the institutions that
currently exist? Rorty's implicit message is that "our" political institutions pretty much define liberal democracy. His assumption that there is
consensus in "our" society on the meaning of democracy, therefore, has
the effect of supporting the status quo.
2. A Faulty Public/PrivateDistinction. Rorty oversimplifies and
misrepresents politics in a second way. He presumes that it is both easy
and necessary to distinguish between the private sphere, where individuals engage in self-regarding conduct, and the public sphere, where the
government uses its legitimate power to regulate harmful other-regarding
conduct. The source of this political theory is John Stuart Mill. Mill is
another of Rorty's heroes, and Rorty comments that no one has ever
improved upon Mill's description of our political choices. 32 According
to Rorty, "J.S. Mill's suggestion that governments devote themselves to
and
optimizing the balance between leaving people's private lives' alone
33
word.
last
the
much
pretty
me
to
seems
preventing suffering
Rorty has divided pragmatism into a public element and a private
element. The public element concerns other-regarding conduct within
the legitimate regulatory sphere of government; Rorty advises using
novels and a free press to increase "our" sensitivity to the suffering of
others and using social and political experimentation to find out what
public institutions and policies work well to decrease that suffering. The
private element concerns self-regarding conduct in which individuals
31. R. RoRTY, supra note 10, at 40.
32. Id. at 63.
33. Id.
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seek to free themselves from social constraints to engage in self-creation
and autonomy through ironic distance from inherited vocabularies and
visions. This public/private division assumes that it is possible to divide
life into realms where individual actions and decisions have no effects on
others, or at least, no effects that legitimately should concern others. It
also assumes that it is easy to make this distinction; Rorty does not elaborate on the distinction, instead assuming that "we" will know what he is
talking about.
Yet the self-regarding/other-regarding distinction is one of the most
elastic distinctions in our legal and political system. 34 In fact, virtually
any action defined by some person as "self-regarding" may be defined by
someone else as "other-regarding" if we take into account all the possible
effects on others of allowing those "private" actions to take place. Consider mandatory seat belt laws. Many people think these statutes constitute illegitimate government intrusion on individual freedom. Drivers,
they contend, should be free to determine the level of risk they are willing
to assume; government should not be forcing people to "strap themselves
in" for their own good. The very notion conjures up images of forced
confinement. On the other hand, the failure to wear a seat belt may have
drastic consequences, not only to those who fail to protect themselves,
but also to a host of others. A person killed or injured because of her
failure to wear a seat belt imposes costs on her family and friends, her
employer, society in general, and, incidentally, on that sacred group
known as "taxpayers." This seemingly private, self-regarding decision is
anything but self-regarding. This means that the distinction between
self-regarding and other-regarding acts is not one that can be made
mechanically; it requires the theorist to adopt a conception of justice to
distinguish those decisions that should be left to individuals, despite their
effects on others, from those that legitimately can be regulated to protect
social interests.
3. A Faulty View of Criticism. Rorty's identification of democracy and freedom with "our" political institutions has profoundly conservative implications. Rorty's acceptance of the existing political
structure (including, it appears, the legal system), and his failure to exercise any critical faculties toward "democratic political institutions" 35
whatsoever is a consequence of his epistemology. For example, Rorty
34. See Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debatein Analytical Jurisprudencefrom Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 975 (exploring the history of the self-regarding/other-regarding
distinction in analytical jurisprudence); see also Judith Shklar, Giving Injustice Its Due, 98 YALE L.J.
1135, 1142-45 (1989) (explaining the meaning of "passive injustice," a form ofinjustice derived from

the failure to prevent injustice).
35. R. RORTY, supra note 10, at 84.
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states, "A liberalsociety is one which is content to call 'true' whatever the
upshot of[free and open] encounters turns out to be." 36 "Free and open
encounters" are the kind that emerge from societies like ours that have
"liberal institutions" of the kind he has described. 37 The negative connotation of this view of truth is that there are no non-contingent foundations for "our" culture's values: This is a good point and well worth
making. But the positive connotation identifies truth with whatever beliefs become dominant in our society. Whether or not he intended to do
so, Rorty has identified reason with the status quo. This is because his
description of politics leaves no room for subcommunities or for disagreements within the dominant culture about social justice.
We could agree with Rorty on the contingency or cultural and historical relativity of values, without accepting his characterization of the
best way to conceptualize those values. In other words, we could accept
the idea that knowledge is the result of a social context without defining
truth as coextensive with the prevailing values in a society. We could do
this by thinking about truth and justice as essentially contested concepts. 38 We could build conflict and a questioning attitude into our reasoning process itself. This requires a sense of distance from one's own
preconceptions, a questioning, skeptical attitude toward inherited values
and institutions, and a willingness to learn from others with different
perspectives.
Yet Rorty contends that irony is inherently threatening to liberal
political values, unless it is privatized. 39 He explains:
But even if I am right in thinking that a liberal culture whose public
rhetoric is nominalist and historicist is both possible and desirable, I
cannot go on to claim that there could or ought to be a culture whose
public rhetoric is ironist. I cannot imagine a culture which socialized
its youth in such a way as to make them continually dubious about
their own
process of socialization. Irony seems inherently a private
4o
matter.
This is an odd statement. Contrary to Rorty, it is not true that commitment is necessarily incompatible with irony.4 1 Moreover, I see every
36. Id. at 52, 67.
37. Id. at 68.
38. See WILLIAM CONNOLLY, THE TERMS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (2d ed. 1983) (quoting
Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, in 56 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY (1955-

56), reprinted in THE IMPORTANCE OF LANGUAGE 121 (Max Black 1962 ed.).
39. R. RORTY, supra note 10, at 190.
40. Id. at 87.
41. Giinter Frankenberg, Down By Law: Irony, Seriousness, and Reason, 83 Nw. U.L. REV.
360 (1989). Two examples who come to mind are Arthur Leff and David Kennedy. See, e.g., David
Kennedy, Spring Break, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1377 (1985); David Kennedy, The Turn to Interpretation,
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 251 (1985); Arthur Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, UnnaturalLaw, 1979 DUKE L.J.
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reason to be committed to the kind of society that does exactly what
Rorty thinks is inconceivable-a society that socializes people into questioning authority of all kinds, not just in their private lives but also in the
public world of politics and law. In fact, doubt about established power
relations is as fundamental to both modem conservative political thought
("get the government off our backs" and "down with big labor") and
liberal thought ("the government cannot legislate morality" and "down
with big business"), as it is to radical political theory (for example,
Roberto Unger's "transformative politics"' 42 and "deviationist doctrine" 43 and in Catharine MacKinnon's critique of gender relations44).
Rorty's argument to keep the recognition of contingency from infecting public values effectively insulates those values from critical evaluation. This construction of the role of philosophy in establishing justice
therefore hides from view the ways in which our categories of thought
and paradigms of analysis orient our attention toward the concerns and
problems of some people and away from the concerns of others. For
example, Rorty's self-regarding/other-regarding distinction oversimplifies politics in a way that has a political effect: It distances those who
achieve success from the victims of what they see as "self-regarding"
conduct. Think of battered women, and the fact that until very recently
spouse abuse was thought of as a private issue to be dealt with by "the
family" in the privacy of the home. The point of the feminist recognition
that "the personal is political" is that the exclusion of certain issues from
political debate and attention, such as the problem of getting adequate
child care or otherwise reconciling the demands of work and family, has
a differential effect on people, depending on both their gender and their
race. 45 Rorty's failure to understand the problematic character of the
self-regarding/other-regarding distinction is disturbing, consequently,
since it displays a more general problem: his failure to recognize the
existence of conflicts of values and perspectives within society and the
differential power among various groups to have their concerns heard
and addressed by the community.
1229; Arthur Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989 (1978); Arthur Left, Economic Analysis of Law
Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974).
42. R. UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 29, at 151-69 (developing a conception of politics
that opens all social institutions to transformation by collective action).

43. R. UNGER, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 29, at 43-90 (developing an expanded
conception of legal doctrine that locates the seeds of social change in existing doctrine),
44. CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW

(1987) (explaining gender hierarchy and power relations).
45. See Kathryn Abrams, GenderDiscriminationand the Transformationof Workplace Norms,
42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1185 (1989); Nancy Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and
the Limitations ofDiscriminationAnalysis in Restructuringthe Workplace, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 79 (1989).
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4. Who Are "We"? The conservative implications of Rorty's
metaphors and his objectification of politics is most obvious in his casual
use of "we." He constantly talks about "our" values, "our" institutions,
"our" culture.4 6 Who are "we"? In an article published several years
before Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty answered a similar criticism by Richard Bernstein4 7 by identifying "we" as "we social democrats," meaning those who are undogmatic about the proper balance
between government regulation and the free market, who are concerned
about the unequal distribution of power and wealth and the divergence
between liberal ideals and imperfect realities, and who cherish "liberal
institutions" like a free press, an independent judiciary, and free
48
universities.
This answer is not satisfactory. It repeats Rorty's mistaken belief
that there is not much to say about the political values that supposedly
unite this group; he seems to think that their meaning is self-evident.
The assumption that he knows the meaning of democracy (whether liberal or social) ties in with his assumption that the only problems of social
justice that we face are either technical problems of how best to implement it or emotive tasks of extending our capacity to relate to different
kinds of people unfamiliar to us. This general world view treats the substantive content of justice as given; it is defined by the predominant values of a society. These values are those of the dominant groups in that
society. Rorty therefore must assume that the dominant values in our
society are good ones and that all oppressed people want is to be let in
the door. All we need to do is extend those clear values to people who
are marginalized. This construction of the problem excludes the possibility that "we" might learn something from oppressed people or that "we"
need to listen to "them." For example, Rorty argues that "[w]e should
stay on the lookout for marginalized people-people whom we still instinctively think of as 'they' rather than 'us.' We should try to notice our
similarities with them." 49 By stating the challenge this way, Rorty
directs his advice-and his attention-to those who are not marginalized; he assumes that his readers do not include anyone who is marginalized. How are such persons to feel on reading such a sentence? The
statement attempts to express the idea that disempowered persons should
be empowered. Yet the very statement that expresses this idea denies it;
the surface statement of "inclusion" is expressed in a way that excludes
and marginalizes those it is intended to empower.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See R. RORTY, supra note 10, at 59-60.
See Bernstein, supra note 29, at 547-49.
Rorty, supra note 30, at 565-67.
R. RORTY, supra note 10, at 196.
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Rorty is right to advise all of us to be on the lookout for people who
are oppressed. But his suggestion that "we should try to notice our similarities with them" again reinforces the power of the dominant "us."
Suppose it turns out that marginalized people are different from "us"?
Does that mean that "they" deserve to be treated differently from "us"?
Rorty assumes that the goal is to include oppressed people into "our"
world, and that there will no need for "us" to change at all other than to
"let them in." This way of stating the problem places "us," meaning
members of dominant groups, in the center of the picture, allowing
"them" into our world if they are sufficiently similar to us. Suppose it
turns out that "our" world view, "our" understanding of democracy or
freedom, "our" values, fail to include or account for their different experiences? Have "we" then no obligation to change?
Rorty suggests that although "we" need to learn to empathize with
oppressed people, "we" do not need to listen to "them." According to
Rorty, there is no "voice of the oppressed" to which "we" need attend.
[V]ictims of cruelty, people who are suffering, do not have much in the
way of a language. That is why there is [sic] no such things as the
"voice of the oppressed" or the "language of the victims." The language the victims once used is not working anymore, and they are suffering too much to put new words together. So the job of putting their
situation into language is going to have to be done for them by somebody else. 50
This view displays arrogance in presuming to speak for people
whose experiences are different from Rorty's. It also fails to recognize
that "we" might have to change if we attended to people with experiences different from our own; we might have to give up some of our
power.
C. A FailedEffort to Separate Philosophy and Justice
I have argued that in various ways Rorty has identified social justice
with the prevailing norms of whatever groups are most powerful in a
given society. His epistemology5 l (deriving truth from the values of lib50. Id. at 94.
51. Rorty claims that he has no epistemology. See R. RORTY, supra note 12 (arguing for a
world which does not need epistemological foundations for belief and social practice). This is true in
the sense that he seeks to eschew the search for fixed metaphysical foundations for knowledge. But if
epistemology means how we know what we know, or how we think about facts and values, Rorty
clearly has an epistemology which points to the culture of particular communities as the basis for
knowledge. He clearly thinks he knows something, although he has not articulated or explained
how he knows what he knows. Perhaps more important, Rorty has a conception about how other
people know and what they can know. The absence of metaphysical foundations for belief may
remove the need for timeless, context-independent grounds for belief, but it cannot remove the need
to have a conception about how we think about thinking and how we judge what we think we know.
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eral communities) is linked with a political vision (deriving the meaning
of democracy from the predominant institutions in the United States).
His attempt to separate philosophy and justice thus fails. Rorty's conception of justice explicitly refers to the values and perspectives of dominant groups. He therefore uses a particular conception of philosophy in
the service of particular power relations, while at the same time he claims
to be in favor of withdrawing philosophy from the public sphere.
To give one example, Rorty's view of self-fulfllment has a characteristically male flavor. He focuses on autonomy, freedom from social
control, and the creation of something new as the keys to creating a
meaningful life. This world view sees connections with other people as
problematic and individual autonomy and self-assertion as liberating and
comforting. It is a peculiarly non-relational and negative conception of
freedom: It emphhasizes freedom from others. In contrast, feminists
have argued that many women understand self-fulfillment as taking place
in the context of relationships with others. This world view sees isolation
and the inability to connect with others as problematic, whereas the ability to attend to overlapping relationships is a central aspect of personal
identity.5 2 If this is correct, then Rorty's description of the meaning of
freedom and self-fulfillment will be appealing only to some people and
not to others. Yet Rorty wants these things for everyone. Either we
must listen to the different perspective of others, namely women, who
think relationally, rather than individualistically, and imagine a kind of
society that would enable people to find self-fulfillment in different ways,
or we must engage in a process of consciousness-raising so that we can
learn which of the divergent visions of self-fulfillment is the result of false
consciousness or adaptation to unjust and restricted circumstances, and
then free ourselves from that cramped vision. In either case, we cannot
simply rest on our intuitions about the meaning of freedom or democracy. Nor should we presume that a theorist like John Stuart Mill "had
the last word." We must attend to the different perspectives and experiences of different people. We also must concern ourselves with the ways
in which our categories and modes of thought get in the way of our
projects of creating justice and freeing people from oppression.
I believe that Rorty's failure to see or focus on issues like this is a
direct result of his conception of the relation between philosophy and
justice. Rorty's removal of philosophy from the public sphere, and his
reliance on the dominant values of a culture to prescribe the meaning of
justice and democracy, treats issues of justice as given, as
52. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VoICE (1982); Mar J. Matsuda, LiberalJurisprudence
and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist Critique of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 16
N.M.L. REv. 613 (1986).
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unproblematic. 53 Although I agree that we should stop worrying about
the metaphysical foundations of justice, this does not mean that we
should not be concerned about ways of conceptualizing justice. Nor does
it mean that philosophy has nothing to offer us by way of helping us in
thinking about the way we think. If we do this, we may begin to unearth
the ways in which our modes of analysis get in the way of our own
projects.
In the end, Rorty's prescription for philosophy is arid. First, Rorty
falls into the very metaphysics he hoped to escape. This is an internal
critique: Rorty violates his own criteria for success. He argues correctly
that philosophy cannot provide uncontestable, metaphysical foundations
for thought, and that it cannot provide criteria by which we can judge
which of several paradigms of analysis is superior. This recognition of
context and the contingency of social practices provides a solid-but
shifting-starting place for normative inquiry. But Rorty wrongly concludes from this recognition that philosophy can do nothing to help us to
understand the public sphere of politics. His conclusion rests on an
unacceptably narrow-one might even say essentialist-conception of
54
the questions philosophers ask and the methodologies they employ.
Rorty never considers the possibility that philosophical techniques might
be invented or adapted to help clarify the implications of different ways
of approaching questions of politics and justice. Nor does he consider
that philosophic inquiry might help reveal the ways in which our language, concepts, and discourse may sabotage our own projects by orienting our attention in ways that obscure considerations we take to be
important. His attempt to separate philosophy from politics, and to separate the private sphere, where we promote irony and individual autonomy, from the public sphere, where we prevent cruelty, leads Rorty to
reify both philosophy and politics. He takes both of these social activities
out of "our" hands, thereby stripping us of our ability to remake them.
Remake them we must, however. This brings us to a second, external critique: Rorty's version of the relation between philosophy and jus53. As political theorist William Connolly explains:
Rorty's language tranquilizes and comforts his fellow Americans, first, by celebrating the
technocratic values, self-conceptions, and economic arrangements operative in (though not
exhaustive of) American institutions and, second, by implying that once these endorsements have been offered there is not much more to be said. Rorty's prose inhibits discursive mobilization of political energies; it closes the conversation before it manages to
disturb the sense that all is well with America.... Rorty drops out of the conversation just
when it should become more intense and demanding.
PETER NovICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE "OBJECTIVITY QUESTION" AND THE AMERICAN HIS-

PROFESSION 566-67 (1988) (citing William Connolly, MirrorofAmerica, RARITAN 3 Summer 1983, at 124, 131).
54. See Bernstein, supra note 29, at 547.
TORICAL
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tice undermines the search for social justice. Rorty's construction of the
relation between philosophy and justice is surprisingly unpragmatic. He
argues against taking comfort in false foundations for belief; we human
beings, he argues, are the creators of our own social world. We make the
world in our image, and we are therefore responsible for the image we
adopt. Yet Rorty violates this message by substituting objective political
facts for discredited philosophical facts. Rather than deferring to the
immanent values of "our" culture, our goal should be to become aware
of the ways in which our categories of thought and our paradigms of
discourse channel our thinking in particular ways. We need to do this to
attain the pragmatic goal of understanding the effects of our ways of
thinking about the world, and to accept responsibility for the consequences of what we do. More important, we need to understand how our
ways of describing the world and conceptualizing the problems of life
reinforce the power of dominant groups in society. 55 Rorty champions
social justice, yet his approach reinforces some of the very power relations he had hoped to challenge. We need to focus on the ways in which
our categories, discourse, and modes of analysis reinforce illegitimate
power relationships by embodying the perspectives and concerns of those
56
who are powerful and suppressing members of oppressed groups.
III. PEBBLES AND DooRS
[O]ur views can function to assert or express domination without explicitly or consciously intending to justify it.57
For someone to have
privilege is precisely not to have to beg for
8
attention to one's case.
-Elizabeth V. Spelnan
A.

Why Philosophy Is Important for Justice

In her brilliant book, Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in
Feminist Thought, Elizabeth V. Spelman analyzes the meaning of gender
from a feminist perspective. The problem that forms the center of
55. Rorty's father, James Rorty, an independent Marxist journalist, thought "Americans would
do well to rid themselves of 'the democratic dogma expressed in the phrase "We, the people." We
have never had in this country any such identity of interest as is implied in that first person plural.'"
WILLIAM STOTr, DOCUMENTARY EXPRESSION AND THiRTIES AMERICA 239 (1973) (quoting
JAMES RORTY, WHERE Lisa is BETrER 169 (1936)).

56. Cornel West also criticizes Rorty for failing to focus on issues of power. West, supra note
27, at 207-10. Interestingly, West makes a similar criticism of Dewey, who, West argues, envisioned
a homogeneous society characterized by widespread consensus and not racked by oppressive power
relationships. Id. at 101-02.
57. EN. SPELMAN, supra note 5, at 11.
58. Id. at 76.
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Spelman's concern is the tendency of many feminist theorists to focus on
the experience of white, middle-class women and to ignore or obscure the
experience of other women. As an entry into this problem, Spelman reexamines the political thought of Plato and Aristotle, focusing on their
treatment of the relations among gender, race, and class. She then engages in a detailed critique of selected feminist theorists, including Nancy
Chodorow and Simone de Beauvoir. Spelman concludes that it is inappropriate to conceptualize gender in terms of a binary division between
male and female; rather, gender, is complex, variegated, and multiple.
By analyzing the question of the relations among gender, race, and
class, Spelman illustrates the importance of methodological questions in
analyzing social justice. Her analysis demonstrates how philosophical
techniques can be used to uncover mistakes in previous failed efforts to
think about justice. Those failures include the ways in which innocuous
assumptions both embody and obscure power relationships. Spelman's
analysis therefore illustrates both the ways in which pragmatic approaches to social questions may unconsciously recreate objectivist assumptions, and the ways in which our patterns of thought may recreate
the very power relationships we meant to challenge. She shows how the
way we think reinforces oppression and how critical reflection can uncover and challenge our self-defeating assumptions. In so doing, she convincingly demonstrates why lawyers should care about philosophy.
Spelman argues that "how one starts, in thinking as in acting, has
everything to do with where one might go. ' ' 5 9 The way we think about
the problems of life constrains what we can see. We inevitably make
some issues salient and others obscure; we focus on the experiences of
some people and ignore those of others. For this reason, and in contrast
to Rorty, Spelman cautions those of us who think about justice to beware
of how the assumptions underlying our conceptual paradigms affect our
analysis of oppression. She asks us to "wonder to what extent.., theory
6
implicitly endorses forms of hierarchy it explicitly critiques."
Spelman assumes, without arguing, that philosophical inquiry is
context-dependent and relative to social and historical circumstance.
Rorty spends half his time trying to persuade us of this point. To some
extent, therefore, Spelman starts where Rorty stops. Rorty spends the
second half of his argument attempting to convince us that philosophy
has nothing to offer us in developing and understanding political values.
Unlike Rorty, Spelman believes that one goal of philosophical inquiry is
59. Id at xi.
60. Id. at x.
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to increase self-understanding of members of a particular culture about
matters of public importance. Her book shows us one way to do this.
John Dewey argued that philosophers should engage with the political and social problems of the day.6 1 In contrast to Rorty, Spelman
takes Dewey's message to heart, using the tools of philosophy to promote
justice. She does this by reflecting on how our ways of thinking promote
conditions of oppression by marginalizing the experiences and concerns
of those who are most oppressed. For this reason, although Rorty champions pragmatism, Spelman is the better heir to Dewey's legacy.
Spelman argues that the categories and forms of discourse we use,
the assumptions with which we approach the world, and the modes of
analysis we employ have important consequences in channeling our attention in particular directions. The paradigms we adopt affect what we
see and how we interpret it. They determine, to a large extent, who we
listen to and what we make of what we hear. They determine what questions we ask and the kinds of answers we seek.
Investigation into such matters is important, according to Spelman,
because the seemingly neutral and innocuous assumptions with which we
approach the world may blot from our view facts we ourselves would
consider to be important. In this way, we may unconsciously recreate or
express forms of hierarchy that we intended to criticize. Self-reflection
about such matters may enable us to ferret out the political effects of
seemingly neutral premises. We should be on the lookout for ways in
which our approaches to problems of illegitimate power relations reinforce those very relations. 62 Good intentions do not immunize against
the illegitimate exercise of power. In fact, a great impetus to the exercise
of power is the inability to recognize that one is exercising it; when this
happens, one need not worry about whether that power is being used
wisely. One goal of philosophic inquiry, therefore, is to understand con63
cretely where privilege lodges in our thought.
B.

How Innocuous Assumptions Reinforce Oppression

1. Pebbles: Universality and Particularity. Spelman argues that
many feminist theorists focus on the experience of white, middle-class
women, thereby obscuring the experience of other women. This happens
in the following way. Feminist theorists have analyzed sexism by at61. J. DEWEY, supra note 4, at 26, 124.
62. See, ag., KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
OF VICTIMS (1988); Martha Minow, Speaking of Silence (Book Review), 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 493,
495 (1988) (reviewing THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY) (arguing that "antidiscrimination laws [may]
manifest and recreate some of the harms they were supposed to redress").
63. E.V. SPELMAN, supra note 5, at 75.
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tempting to isolate it from other forms of oppression, such as race, class,
and religious discrimination. In doing so, they have tried to identify
what it means to be oppressed "as a woman" rather than by virtue of
other traits that one might possess. To do this, feminists have adopted
the social science method of isolating gender as a variable to be explained
and "controlling for" other variables, like race and class. This method
directs the theorist to consider the experiences of women who are not
oppressed on account of traits other than gender. It further assumes that
we can understand the experiences of people oppressed on several accounts by combining our analyses of the different forms of oppression
they face. For example, this methodology assumes that we can understand the situation of black women by combining our analyses of sexism
and racism.
Spelman notes that this seemingly innocuous and rational procedure
for inquiry has the effect of directing our attention to the experiences of
white, middle-class women. What is more disturbing is that it does so
"without mentioning white middle-class women. "64 Rather than talking
about what all women have in common, feminist theorists have conflated
the condition of middle-class, white women with the condition of all
women.65 Yet "the more universal the claim one might hope to make
about women-'women have been put on a pedestal' or 'women have
been treated like slaves'-the more likely it is to be false."' 66 Moreover,
universal claims about women that "control for" other forms of oppres"sion are false-not randomly, but in a particular direction. They direct
attention to the problems and experiences of women who are privileged
in various ways and obscure the problems and experiences of women
who face the greatest number of socially-imposed obstacles to a full life.
Spelman locates this problem in the general philosophical problem
of universality and particularity. She illustrates this problem by relating
the story of Uncle Theo, a character in an Iris Murdoch novel who is
overcome by the plethora of pebbles on the beach.6 7 Their multiplicity
makes the world seem complicated and unmanageable. If each pebble is
distinct, and if those distinctions matter, then each pebble demands his
attention. These demands cause Uncle Theo "acute discomfort" because
it would be impossible to answer them; he cannot pay equal attention to
millions of pebbles. His response is to simplify the many-ness of the pebbles by focusing on what they share. "The horror of the manyness of the
pebbles could then be stilled by the awareness that they are all instances
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

76.
3.
9.
1.
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of a single thing, pebblehood. ' '6 This solution seizes one horn of the
dilemma of universality and particularity. That dilemma requires us to
pay attention to the level of generality at which we speak about the
world.
[W]hat is the world really made of? Do we get closer to an answer to
this question by noting the manyness of the pebbles, or by reflecting on
the fact that though there are many pebbles, there is only one
69 kind of
thing, the kind of thing that they all are, namely, a pebble?
This question engages two issues: First, at what level of generality
should we speak and, second, how do we generalize? For example, we
want to know whether women's experiences should be investigated separately from men's experiences, and, if so, how we generalize about
"women"-whose experiences count as the prototypical "woman's
experience."
2. The Dilemma ofDifference. Feminists have argued that traditional theorists have distorted our understanding of human experience by
describing the world from the vantage point of men. Traditional theorists have generated accounts of human life that exclude the distinct experiences of women. These accounts wrongly fail to note the divergent
experiences of women and, by describing male experience as human experience, wrongly conflate the experience of men (a subset of people)
with all people. (They also conflate the experience of some men with that
of all men.) At the same time, Spelman argues that feminists have made
a similar mistake. In attempting to explain how "women's experiences"
differ from "men's experiences," and therefore deserve attention in their
own right, feminists have failed to focus on the divergent experiences of
different kinds of women. They have described "women's experience"
not by describing what all women share, but rather by describing the
experience of a particular subset of women. In so doing, they have conflated the experience of some women with that of all women.
One response to this complaint might be that it is impossible to focus on everything at once, and that the "special" experiences of women
oppressed on several counts can be explained by combining accounts of
sexism, racism, and classicism. Otherwise, the argument might go, we
are faced with the specter of Uncle Theo's plethoraphobia; if we focus on
the many divergent experiences of women, we will not be able to understand sexism-the power relations between "men" and "women"-at all.
If distinctions among different experiences matter, how do we stop the
multiplication of distinctions? If we do not, explanation becomes impos68. Id.

69. Id.
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sible; this is because, in some sense, every case is different since every
woman's experience is unique.
Spelman explains, however, that this response cannot work. One
reason is the "dilemma of difference." Both the "assertion of difference
and the denial of difference can operate on behalf of domination. ' 70 The
attribution of difference may justify power by explaining that women are
different from men and therefore deserve to be treated differently; this
different treatment may explicitly or implicitly grant men power over
women. For example, Plato and Aristotle justified explicit male
supremacy by explaining that men were generally superior to women,
and therefore justly ruled them, because masculine characteristics were
superior to feminine characteristics. 71 Similarly, the "separate spheres"
ideology, although formally egalitarian by granting members of each sex
an appropriate social role based on their supposed relative competencies,
implicitly perpetuated male power by confining women's legitimate place
72
to the home.
On the other hand, the failure to note differences also may perpetuate illegitimate power relationships. 73 Providing the same treatment to
groups who are differently situated may have the effect of privileging one
group over another. For example, requiring both husbands and wives to
support themselves after divorce may have the effect of relegating women
to a lower standard of living while granting men a higher standard of
living. This result occurs because women, on average, earn only twothirds of the salary earned by men and because women have a greater
tendency to withdraw, partly or totally, from the paid wage market during the marriage and therefore may face greater barriers to earning an
adequate living when the marriage terminates. 74 Similarly, the failure of
feminist theorists to focus on differences among the experiences of different groups of women may recapitulate sexism by failing to note the ways
in which the sexism suffered by black women, for instance, differs from
the sexism suffered by white women. "The sexism most Black women
70. Id. at 11.
71. Spelman explains that both Plato's and Aristotle's views are more complicated than this,
For example, Plato argued that women who possess male characteristics are capable of performing
the male task of ruling others. Similarly, Aristotle differentiated between men and women of differ-

ent social classes, for example, giving women power over male slaves. See infra text accompanying
notes 74-80.
72. NANCY Co'rr, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: "WOMAN'S SPHERE" IN NEw ENGLAND,

1780-1835 (1977); Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything That Grows". Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 819, 846-51.
73. See Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101
HARV. L. REv. 10 (1987) (explaining the dilemma of difference).
74. LENORE WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 204-07 (1985).
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have experienced has not typically included being put on a pedestal." '75
Failure to consider the different forms of sexism suffered by different
groups of women therefore has the effect of obscuring the operation of
sexism in society.
The refusal to consider relevant differences among women's experiences raises the dilemma of difference. Focusing on differences among
women may obscure the workings of sexism by making it more difficult
to explain; it also may recapitulate illegitimate hierarchies by drawing
our attention to the very differences that wrongly have been made to
matter. On the other hand, the failure to consider different experiences
of different women may recreate the very power relationships the analysis was meant to challenge. It may do this by excluding from consideration the lived reality of subgroups who face forms of oppression not faced
by those whose experiences are taken as the norm. A perspective that
fails to consider the dilemma of difference may wind up supporting the
very power structures it was intended to critique.
3. The Ampersand Problem: Race & Gender. Another reason
why it is important to focus on the experiences of different groups of
women is that focusing on the experience of white, middle-class women
as the definition of "women's experience" conveniently removes from
theoretical consideration the possibility of white women's sexist treatment of black women, as well as white women's participation in racism,
classicism, and other forms of oppression. Women may help to perpetuate sexism by their own acquiescence or participation in ways of life that
restrict their own possibilities, restrict their vision, or otherwise limit
their power. Moreover, to the extent that black women and white
women face different sorts of oppression, white women may help to
subordinate black women by exercising forms of power over them that
differ from the kinds of power they may exercise over black men. If, for
example, women are disproportionately relegated to making decisions
about the home, and if black women are more likely than white women
to provide domestic services, then white women may help to perpetuate
sexism by the ways in which they treat the black women that they employ. A failure to consider the different experiences of black and white
women obscures this kind of power.
If black women do not fit the white model, then the definition of
"women's experience," by reference to the experience of white women,
treats black women as not really women. In fact, historically, one mode
of oppression of black women has been the social differentiation between
75. E.V.

SPELMAN,

supra note 5, at 14.
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sexual relations of blacks and whites. One aspect of racial privilege may
have been to deny black women the assertedly positive roles of white
women; one way to put down a group of people is to claim that relations
between men and women in that group do not fit the ideal model practiced by the dominant group. This social practice may deny to black
women the right to be thought of as "women" at all. As Spelman
explains,
[W]ithin any single society the definitions and expectations of what it
means to be a woman will vary greatly. This is often a bitter truth, as
we reflect, for example, on the lot of a white slaveowner's wife "as a
woman" and on the condition of a slave woman "as a woman." Sojourner Truth's question, 76"Ain't I a Woman?" would not have arisen
or made sense otherwise.
Spelman emphasizes this point by quoting Barbara Smith: "When
you read about Black women being lynched, they aren't thinking of us as
females. The horrors that we have experienced have absolutely every77
thing to do with them not even viewing us as women.",
4. The Inadequacy ofAdditive Analyses. The problem of the relation between sexism and racism cannot be solved by additive analyses
that, for example, attempt to combine accounts of sexism and racism to
explain the experiences of black women. Additive procedures raise what
Spelman calls the "ampersand problem. '78 They perpetuate racism by a
discursive practice that places white women at the center of attention
and necessitates the inclusion of black women into the picture after the
fact. This paradigm implies that the concerns and experiences of white
women are more important or central than those of black women. It also
reinforces racism by placing white women at the center of attention.
Consider the social use of the word "woman." If we need to add the
adjective "black" to "woman" to draw attention to black women, but we
do not need to add the adjective "white" to draw attention to white
women, we not only have made the experiences of black women somehow peripheral, but we have defined black women as less clear examples
of "women" than are white women.
[A] discussion promising to deal with how "women" fare in the United
States military shouldn't end up, logically speaking, being simply
about white women; but if the group called "women" is contrasted to
the groups called "Blacks" . . . it becomes clear that "women" really
has meant "white women" all along. But why wasn't that said explicitly? Both because it didn't need to be-we expect mainstream news76. Id. at 14.
77. Id. at 37.
78. Id. at 114-32.
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papers to indicate a woman's race if, and only if, she is not white-and
because it needed not to be noted, lest the normative status white women have as "women" be eroded. Black women's being Black somehow calls into question their counting as straightforward examples of
"women," but white women's being white does not. As long as "women" are compared to "Blacks," a decision will have to be made about
whether to classify Black women as "Black" or as "women," but not
' 79
about whether to classify white women as "white" or as "women."
One aspect of privilege is not to have to call attention to one's case.8 0
Additive analyses obscure the position of people who fit into more
than one category. The phrase "women and blacks" obscures-one
might say obliterates-black women. Logically, black women fit into
both categories. However, experientially, this way of organizing thought
often has the effect of rendering black women invisible. An employer
eager to avoid charges of discrimination against "women and blacks"
might respond by hiring white women and black men, thereby satisfying
both categories. The fact that not a single black woman was considered
for employment is excluded from consideration as a significant piece of
information. Moreover, if black women experience different kinds of oppression than those faced by either white women or black men, those
forms of oppression will not be revealed by analysis that does not take
differences between white and black women into account.8 1 As Spelman
explains, "we surely cannot produce an accurate picture of Latina women's lives simply by combining an account of Anglo women's lives and
'8 2
one of Latino men's lives."
In another example, Spelman notes that although Simone de
Beauvoir paid attention to race, class, and religious discrimination, as
well as to gender discrimination, she often compared the plight of women
to that of" 'Jews, the Black, the Yellow, the proletariat, slaves, servants,
the common people.' ,,s3 But this comparison "obscures the fact that
half of the populations to whom she compares women consist of women."'8 4 It therefore takes our attention away from Jewish women, black
women, Asian women, working class women, while defining the "women's experience" in a way that excludes them.
79. Id. at 169.
80. Id. at 76.
81. See, e.g., Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding OurPlace, Asserting OurRights, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9, 10 (1989); Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizingthe
Intersection of Race and Sex:. A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist
Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. OF CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 141-50.
82. E.V. SPELMAN, supra note 5, at 14.
83. Id. at 64.
84. Id. at 65.
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E. Multiple Genders
1. Plato and Aristotle. One road to addressing the relation
among race, class, and gender is to conceptualize gender as a multiple,
rather than a dual, scheme of social differentiation. In several revealing
chapters, Spelman explores the gender analysis of Plato and Aristotle.
She concludes that both these philosophers understood gender in conjunction with other factors, particularly social class. For example,
although Plato argued that some women were fit to be philosopher-rulers, he also argued that "women" displayed undesirable qualities, such as
showing grief at funerals. Spelman reconciles these positions by noting
that Plato believed that not all women would be typically feminine; however, he accepted the inferiority of "feminine" qualities, whether exhibited in men or women. s5 He therefore concluded that women were not
disqualified, by virtue of their sex, from performing as philosopher-rulers; rather, only certain women were capable of playing this role in society-those that possessed masculine characteristics. Conversely, men
who possessed female characteristics were excluded from consideration
for the post of ruler. s6 "Plato's argument for the equality of some women to some men was inextricably intertwined with an argument for the
superiority of that group of men and women to all other people."8 7 Gender and class are intertwined.
Similarly, Aristotle differentiated between men, women, and
slaves. 88 What does this categorization do to female slaves? It means
that "[w]henever Aristotle speaks of the differences between 'men and
women,' he is in fact distinguishing between men and women of a particular social class, the citizen class." 89 It suggests that gender differentiation is important only for people who are not slaves. Female slaves do
not merit the appellation of "women"; nor do male slaves merit the appellation of "men." The differentiation between men, women, and slaves
makes clear that "one's gender identity is inseparable from one's 'racial'
identity: only certain males and females count as 'men' and 'women.' "90
"One must not only be male but be of a particular 'race' to be masculine." 91 A major defining characteristic of being a slave is the absence of
a right to a gender; a major defining characteristic of a citizen is the right
to a gender.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

32-33.
32-35.
35.
41-43.
46.
54.
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These insights into Plato's and Aristotle's conceptions of the relations between gender, race, and class remind us that notions of gender
may vary widely among social classes and races. Sexism may work quite
differently in different social classes, and the different gender relations
within classes of persons may support other forms of oppression. "What
makes middle-class women dependent on men of their class is the same
as what distinguishes them from working class women." 9 2 This means
that different classes will exhibit different forms of gender relations and
different types of oppression of women. If this is true, there are many
genders, rather than only two.
2. Doors: The Contexts of Gender. Spelman argues that "there is
a great variety in what it means to be a woman" 93 and that gender therefore cannot be analytically isolated from consideration of class and race
identity. If it could, we could talk about relations between men and
women without worrying about whether they were in the same class or
race. 94 Yet "[t]he ideology of masculinity in the United States hardly
includes the idea that Black men are superior to white women." 95 She
reminds us that "if Emmet Till had been white, he wouldn't have been
murdered by white men for talking to a white woman, nor would his
murderers have been acquitted. ' 96 Moreover, just as race affects gender,
gender affects race: "[W]e can't understand the racism that fueled white
men's lynching of Black men without understanding its connection to the
sexism that shaped their protective and possessive attitudes toward white
women." 97 Gender therefore must be analyzed "in the context of other
98
factors of identity.
Given that gender is multiple and complex, rather than binary, and
that it must be understood in the context of other factors like race and
class, how should analysis proceed? Spelman explains that we must be
aware of the ways in which our categorical schemes affect what we see
and how we interpret it. The ways in which we combine gender analysis
with other factors will have crucial effects on how we understand social
relationships. Spelman imagines an auditorium filled with all kinds of
people who are to proceed through various doors differentiating them
based on their race, sex, and class. Suppose the first set of doors divides
men from women, and the second set divides people based on their race.
92. Id. at 63.
93. Id. at 102.
94. Id. at 81.

95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 89.
Id.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 102.
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This schema suggests that Asian-American women share more in common with African-American women than they do with Asian-American
men. On the other hand, suppose the first set of doors divides people by
race and the second divides them based on sex. In that case, AsianAmerican women are assumed to have more in common with AsianAmerican men than with African-American women. 99 The first schema
suggests that it is possible to think about oneself "as a woman" in isolation from other facts about oneself; the second schema suggests that
thinking about oneself "as a woman" must take place in the context of
other factors about oneself.1°°
Awareness of these complexities can help us to consider the ways in
which our categorical schemes reinforce the very forms of oppression
that they were invented to combat. Sensitivity to those who are oppressed requires not only that we acquire greater sensitivity toward
others, but also that we attempt to empathize with others; we must see
things as others see them. People are oppressed in many ways; this
means, Rorty to the contrary, that "we" must listen to people who are
oppressed in ways that we are not.
But empathy is not enough. Spelman argues that, because people
have different experiences, we cannot get at the truth by ourselves. Her
philosophical message about epistemology is that we cannot reason
alone. We cannot pretend to know everything and we cannot pretend to
speak for others. To define "we" as including everyone, we must engage
with others, not abstractly, but in fact; we must work with others whose
experiences differ from our own in ways that remake the power relationship between us.' 0 1 Those who are privileged must become apprentices
to those who are oppressed. We must struggle together to develop a
form of intellectual/political practice that remakes the power relationships that structure and impede our knowledge. We come to know in
relation to others; knowledge is social. We must therefore remake social
relationships so that we are engaged with people who might challenge
what we think we know.
D. Moral Complexity and Oppression
It is of the nature of privilege to find ever deeper places to hide.102
-Elizabeth V. Spelman
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 146.
Id.
Id. at 178-85.
Id. at 183.
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Rorty argues that philosophy cannot provide metaphysical foundations for our conceptions of truth and justice; nor can it provide uncontestable criteria for choice among competing possible approaches to
thinking about life. These are powerful statements, and I believe they are
right. However, Rorty wrongly concludes from these premises that philosophy is irrelevant to public life. Justice is a question of politics, he
says, which entails commitment to the democratic values embedded in
our culture; truth, in turn, is whatever views emerge from free and open
discussion in a democratic society like ours. The only fundamental problem, according to Rorty, is the fact that some people are marginalized
and excluded from the mainstream. He argues that "we" need to increase our ability to empathize with these people by learning about
"them" through evocative artistic depictions of their lives. Once "we"
see "them" as "one of us," we will be moved to include them in "our"
world.
This viewpoint assumes that democracy and justice, as embodied in
our culture, have a relatively determinate meaning-not a metaphysical
essence, just a political coherence. It excludes the possibility that "we"
might have to change by our encounters with people who are oppressed.
It assumes that our frameworks of analysis are neutral techniques for
elaborating the values of "our culture."
Spelman demonstrates that nothing could be further from the truth.
Our frameworks of analysis may direct our attention away from those
who are oppressed, despite their surface neutrality. Those frameworks
and methodologies may express the worldviews and experiences of subgroups of people, but yet purport to express the experiences of everyone.
As Martha Minow argues, "We cannot know without standing somewhere, and because we are situated somewhere, we cannot see everything."103 For this reason, the failure to focus on, and engage with,
people who are excluded from both ideological and political power structures reinforces the power of those who dominate. 1°4
Radical approaches are not immune from this problem. Roberto
Unger's excellent work focuses on increasing both freedom and democracy by bringing our institutional and political structures more within
our collective control. These institutions must be transformed to abolish
the oppressive structures they embody. He suggests that the right way to
103. Martha Minow, Partial Justice: Law and Minorities 55 (unpublished manuscript).
104. For excellent meditations on this problem, see Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97 YALE L.J. 1609 (1988) (casting doubt on the advantages to the
black community of republicanism espoused by Frank Michelman and Cass Sunstein); Kathleen
Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713 (1988) (arguing for a conception of politics as
normative pluralism, which rejects a search for agreement on a single common good).
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do this is to imagine those institutions as contexts that can be transformed by collective action. These transformations are to occur in the
context of "immunity" rights that protect individuals from vulnerability
to specific forms of oppression.10 5 Yet the idea of smashing contexts may
06
be more palatable to some people than to others. Patricia Williams'
1
0
7
and Kimberl6 Crenshaw
note that the deconstruction of established
institutions, such as individualistic legal rights, may be liberating to people who are relatively privileged, yet the same time pose a fundamental
threat to oppressed groups who have not yet been fully recognized as
persons capable of exercising such rights.
My own work on plant closings has focused on protecting the reliance of workers and communities on longstanding relationships with major local employers; protecting this reliance interest is intended to combat
the oppressive use of power by corporations. 10 8 Yet, by focusing on
those who have been fortunate enough to become part of the market, this
approach takes our attention away from those who have been excluded
from the market. It may make their concerns seem peripheral, less worthy of attention, or even insoluble. If legal protection is based solely on
reliance, then those who have had no opportunities to develop relationships on which they can rely, or who have been forcibly deprived of such
relationships, 10 9 have no claim to protection.
Rorty reminds us of the contingent, socially constructed nature of
knowledge. Yet he fails to bring this insight fully to bear in his understanding of politics. Rorty brought us to the right floor in the elevator,
and then told us not to get off.1 0 Spelman shows us how to step out onto
the floor and what we might do there. She reminds us to be on the lookout for the ways in which our approaches to thinking about life may
unconsciously reinforce the very power relationships we were intending
to critique. We can do this partly by using the techniques of analytic
philosophy employed by Spelman. Those techniques can be employed to
good end if we pay attention to and work with those who, in the words of
105. R. UNGER, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 29, at 13-42; R. UNGER, SOCIAL THE-

ORY, supra note 29, at 26-35.

106. Patricia Williams, Alchemical Notes: ReconstructingIdealsfrom DeconstructedRights, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401, 405-06 (1987).

107. Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation
in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1331 (1988).
108. See, eg., Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REv. 611,
750-51 (1988).

109. See, eg., Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents ofBarbarism: The ContemporaryLegacy of
European Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Tradition ofFederal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L.
REV. 237 (1989).
110. I owe this image to Martha Minow.
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Cornelia Spelman, "have been rendered invisible by others' inattention to
111
them."
Does engaging in politics and intellectual inquiry with people of
multiple perspectives make political and legal analysis too complex?
Spelman addresses this question by asking whether paying attention to
the varying experiences of women makes a feminist analysis impossible. 1 2 She answers, "It's only from a position of privilege that it would
seem that the end of focus on white middle-class women has to mean the
end of feminism." 11 3 Gender is obviously an important social category,
but it must be understood in the context of other factors; moreover, the
experiences of white, middle-class women can no longer be taken as
somehow more central aspects of what it means to be a "woman" in our
society than those aspects of other women. Nor does the recognition of
complexity in both truth and justice make it impossible for us to speak
coherently about the world. To believe that it does is to assume that "we
all know truths but mine is the true truth, but if what I say turns out not
114
to be true, then nothing anyone else says can be true either."
IV.

1
MISS MARPLE ON A CERTAIN BLINDNESS IN HUMAN BEINGS "

5

In Agatha Christie's story, A Christmas Tragedy, Miss Marple is
convinced that a man is going to kill his wife. When she does turn up
dead, Miss Marple's attention focuses on proving that the husband is the
murderer. Yet her conviction that the husband is the guilty party blinds
her to the truth. She eventually discovers that the husband could not
have murdered his wife, even though he certainly intended to do so. "I
was so sure," she says, "and that, I think, was what blinded me."' 16 But
then the story takes a new twist: It turns out, in the end, that the husband did murder his wife; the original body was not his wife's body. If
we had taken Miss Marple's words to heart, the new twist would not
surprise us; we would not have been so sure that the new facts were the
final word. But still we are surprised. Her experience shows just how
difficult it is to learn the lesson that we are often blinded by our own
certainty. We think we know, but it turns out that we have a lot to learn.

111. Cornelia Spelman, Introduction, TRIQUARTERLY 75 Spring/Summer 1989, at 5-6.
112. E.V. SPELMAN, supra note 5, at 171-72.
113. Id. at 172.
114. Id. at 184.
115. With apologies to William James. See WILLIAM JAMES, On a Certain Blindness in Human
Beings, in ON SOME OF LIFE'S IDEALS 3 (1912).
116. A. CHRISTIE, supra note 1, at 155.

